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INTRODUCTION

The Minnesota Supreme Court recently revisited the issue of
equitable relief for mistake in SCI Minnesota Funeral Services, Inc. v.
1
Washburn-McReavy Funeral Corp. (SCI). SCI involved a stock sale
agreement—a contract for the sale of a business in corporate
2
form. Both parties to the agreement, the buyer and seller, were
mistaken about the exact mix of assets that were titled to the
3
corporation being sold. When this mistake was discovered after
the sale was complete, the seller sought equitable relief to regain
4
title to the particular assets about which the parties were mistaken.
The framework that courts in the United States have adopted
to resolve when mistakes give rise to equitable relief is historically
5
Notwithstanding this ancient
rooted in medieval England.
heritage, the doctrine of equitable relief for mistake has long
6
suffered from specious judicial articulation and inconsistent
7
application. Generally, equitable relief for a mistake that taints a
1. 795 N.W.2d 855 (Minn. 2011).
2. Id. at 858.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 859.
5. See infra note 23.
6. See infra note 41.
7. See infra note 42 and accompanying text. Courts have struggled much
more broadly to properly apply their equitable powers. The evolution of the
federal courts’ application of equitable doctrines to cases and controversies
involving the federal tax laws provides an excellent display of this struggle.
Throughout history, equitable powers were used to shield aggrieved people by
providing relief where the law inflicted an unjust result. Historically, equitable
powers were never used as a sword against the people. Since 1935, however, the
federal courts have turned this venerable history of equitable jurisdiction on its
head. Despite the Solomonic import of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.’s
famous statement in Rock Island, A. & L. R. Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 141, 143
(1920), that when complying with the federal tax laws, taxpayers must “turn square
corners,” federal courts have used various equitable powers to inflict liability on
taxpayers who turned these corners at perfect right angles. The reason for this
frightening change to the historic application of equitable powers is, no doubt,
subject to considerable differences of political opinion. Whatever may be the true
motives of federal courts for using their powers of equitable jurisdiction as a
sword, it is clear that taxpayers, notwithstanding their having turned “square
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contractual agreement takes shape through the judicial
8
reformation or rescission of that agreement. The idea is that
equitable relief, “such as is required by the circumstances, may be
granted from the consequences of a mistake of any fact which is a
material element of the transaction . . . if there be no adequate
9
remedy at law.” As a result, Minnesota courts may either rescind
an agreement tainted with mistake or reform it so that the
agreement conforms to the objectively manifested intentions of the
10
parties.
Yet questions remain as to how far into the form of an
agreement a Minnesota court will cast its gaze in search of mistakes
for which relief will be granted. In particular, there is the question
of whether a Minnesota court will look through the corporate form
when determining whether to exercise equitable powers and
provide relief for mistakes about the particular composition of
assets and liabilities of a business in corporate form whose stock is
being sold.
As historically formulated in Minnesota, “[e]quity’s vision is
not circumscribed by formal instruments, but extends through
11
matters of form to the heart of the transaction.” The Minnesota
Supreme Court’s decision in SCI, however, strongly suggests that no
type of equitable relief will ever reach through the corporate form
to remedy mutual mistakes about the assets and liabilities of a
corporation—no matter what longstanding judicial principles of
equity have to say.
This note first examines the history of and policies underlying
equitable remedies, including the types of mistakes for which
12
courts will provide equitable relief. It then details the Minnesota
Supreme Court’s holding in SCI, including the supreme court’s
corners” in good faith, have been made to bear tax liabilities at the hands of
federal courts applying such (formerly) equitable doctrines as “substance over
form,” “economic substance,” “sham transaction,” and “step transaction.” See, e.g.,
Wells Fargo & Co. v. United States, 641 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Coltec Indus.,
Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1206
(2007); Jade Trading, LLC v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 11 (2007), aff’d in part,
rev’d on other grounds in part, vacated in part as moot, 598 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
For a comprehensive articulation about how federal courts have turned equitable
jurisdiction on its head when dealing with the federal tax laws, see JASPER L.
CUMMINGS, JR., THE SUPREME COURT’S FEDERAL TAX JURISPRUDENCE 171–89 (2010).
8. See infra notes 37–39 and accompanying text.
9. Thwing v. Hall & Ducey Lumber Co., 40 Minn. 184, 187, 41 N.W. 815, 816
(1889).
10. See infra notes 48, 53 and accompanying text.
11. Holien v. Slee, 120 Minn. 261, 267, 139 N.W. 493, 495 (1913).
12. See infra Part II.
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express refusal to extend the bright-line and form-focused
reasoning of prior case law on rescission to the reformation of
13
stock sale agreements. An analysis of the SCI decision follows the
14
This analysis argues that the supreme
description of the case.
court’s express refusal in SCI to extend to reformation the brightline and form-focused reasoning of prior case law on rescission is
directly contradictory to the reasoning the court ultimately adopted
to deny the equitable remedy of reformation. Finally, this note
concludes that the supreme court’s apparent distaste for looking
through the form—the corporate form—of the stock sale in SCI is
at odds with longstanding judicial principles of equity, effectively
foreclosing any type of meaningful equitable relief for stock sales
tainted with mutual mistake where no fraud or inequitable conduct
15
is involved.
II. HISTORY
A. The Historical Development of Equitable Remedies
Courts and judges have often strayed from strict adherence to
the so-called “black letter law” and have provided aggrieved parties
16
with relief based on the intent of the law and on a sense of justice.
17
This judicial adaptability is called “equity” or equitable relief.
Courts and judges have exercised these equitable powers, also
18
called equitable jurisdiction, for thousands of years. For instance,
magistrates, or praetors, provided equitable relief to ancient
19
Romans. After the Roman Empire collapsed, the courts in much
13. See infra Part III.
14. See infra Part IV.
15. See infra Part V.
16. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *61–62 (citation omitted)
(“From this method of interpreting laws, by the reason of them, arises what we call
equity; which is thus defined by Grotius, ‘the correction of that, wherein the law (by
reason of its universality) is deficient.’ . . . [A]s Grotius expresses it, ‘lex non exacte
definit, sed arbitrio boni viri permittit.’ [The law does not define exactly, but leaves
something to the discretion of a just and wise judge.]”).
17. Id.
18. See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at *49–50. Lord Henry Home Kames, in
his seminal work Principles of Equity, suggests that the ancient exercise of equitable
powers is illustrated in the Biblical story of Moses and the Israelites. LORD HENRY
HOME KAMES, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 3 n.(a) (1825) (citing Exodus 18:25-26).
19. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at *49 (footnotes omitted) (“This distinction
between law and equity, . . . was perfectly familiar to the Romans; . . . but the
power of both centered in one and the same magistrate, who was equally intrusted
[sic] to pronounce the rule of law, and to apply it to particular cases by the
principles of equity.”); see also KAMES, supra note 18, at 13.
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of continental Europe carried on the exercise of equitable powers
20
21
in the Roman tradition. The development of equity in England,
however, is most pertinent to the development of equity in the
United States because, upon statehood, colonial American courts
adopted much of the same equitable jurisdiction as that exercised
22
by the English Court of Chancery.
The English Court of Chancery was presided over by the Office
23
of the Chancellor. The Lord Chancellor, an officer of the King of
England, was delegated “a very considerable portion of the royal
24
prerogative authority pertaining to the administration of justice.”
This authority allowed the Chancellor to ameliorate “the rigor of
the common law, in all cases in which natural justice, equity and
20. A. H. MARSH, HISTORY OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY AND OF THE RISE AND
DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINES OF EQUITY 13 (1890) (“[W]hen the modern
Kingdoms of Europe were established upon the ruins of the [Roman] [E]mpire
almost every state preserved its Chancellor, with different jurisdictions and
dignities according to their different constitutions.”); see also 3 BLACKSTONE, supra
note 16, at *49 n.a (citation omitted) (“Thus too the parliament of Paris, the court
of session in Scotland, and every other jurisdiction in Europe of which we have any
tolerable account, found all their decisions as well upon principles of equity as
those of positive law.”).
21. KAMES, supra note 18, at 4 (“The establishment of the court of chancery in
England, made it necessary to give a name to the more ordinary branch of law,
that is, the province of the common or ordinary courts; it is termed, the Common
Law, and in opposition to it, the extraordinary branch devolved on the court of
chancery it termed Equity . . . .”).
22. See, e.g., El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp., 669
A.2d 36, 39 (Del. 1995) (stating that the Delaware Court of Chancery “has only
that limited jurisdiction that the Court of Chancery in England possessed at the
time of the American Revolution, or such jurisdiction as has been conferred upon
it by the Delaware General Assembly”); Walker v. Morris, 14 Ga. 323, 327 (1853)
(“Equity Jurisprudence generally embraces the same matters of jurisdiction and
modes of remedy, as exist in England.”); Amelung v. Seekamp, 9 G. & J. 468, 468
(Md. 1838) (“The principles and powers of the court of chancery in England, at
the time of the revolution, not altered by our legislation, nor inapplicable to our
political institutions, are the same by which the court of chancery of Maryland is
governed.”); Jones v. Boston Mill Corp., 21 Mass. (4 Pick.) 507, 527 (1827) (stating
that Massachusetts courts have “all the authority and power which is enjoyed or
exercised by tribunals which entertain [equitable] jurisdiction in England”); Wells
v. Pierce, 27 N.H. 503, 512 (1853) (noting that the courts of New Hampshire
exercise jurisdiction “coextensive with those of the court of chancery, and other
courts of equity in England”); Mattison v. Mattison, 20 S.C. Eq. (1 Strob. Eq.) 387,
388 (1847) (noting that the equitable powers of the Court of Appeals of Equity of
South Carolina was “confined to cases of Chancery cognizance in Great Britain”).
23. See MARSH, supra note 20, at 13–15. According to Marsh, the English
Court of Chancery was officially recognized through an act of King Edward III in
the mid-fourteenth century as a regular English court with jurisdiction over
matters of “grace.” Id. at 29–30. Prior to this official recognition, the jurisdiction
of the Court of Chancery was broader, and mixed with the common law. Id. at 17.
24. Id. at 14.
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25

good conscience required his intervention.”
In this way, the
powers of the Court of Chancery were lenitive to the powers of the
English courts of common law—courts whose authority was strictly
limited to providing remedies created by some positive English law,
26
such as a writ or a statute.
B. The Purpose and Scope of Equitable Remedies
It is evident, then, that equitable remedies were founded in a
sense of justice, where adherence to the black letter law created a
result believed to be unjust or inconsistent with the intent of the
27
In order to reach this type of justice, equitable
law’s maker.
remedies were compelled to develop unhindered by formalities
because they were intended to address the substance of the
28
Given the broad nullifying
circumstances of particular cases.
effects that sweeping judicial exercises of equitable powers could
have on the black letter law, however, courts established rules
limiting their use of equitable remedies to particular judicially
29
One such circumstance is the occasion
defined circumstances.
where a written contractual agreement does not reflect the
30
objectively manifested intentions of the parties to that agreement.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 30.
27. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at *429 (“Equity then, in it’s [sic] true and
genuine meaning, is the soul and spirit of all law: positive law is construed, and
rational law is made, by it. In this, equity is synonymous to justice; in that, to the
true sense and sound interpretation of the rule.”)
28. 1 GEORGE SPENSE, THE EQUITABLE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY
390 (1846) (“In the Court of Chancery, no writ or formula imposed any fetter of
form; and the court not being tied to forms, was able to modify the relief given by
its decrees to answer all the particular exigencies of the case fully and
circumstantially . . . .”).
29. See KAMES, supra note 18, at 13 (“To determine every particular case,
according to what is just, equal, and salutary, taking in all circumstances, is
undoubtedly the idea of a court of equity in its perfection; and had we angels for
judges, such would be their method of proceeding, without regarding any rules . .
. but men are liable to prejudice and error, and for that reason, cannot safely be
trusted with unlimited powers. Hence, the necessity of establishing rules, to
preserve uniformity of judgment in matters of equity as well as of common law . . .
the necessity is perhaps greater in the former, because of the variety and intricacy
of equitable circumstances.”); see also 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at *62 (“[T]he
liberty of considering all cases in an equitable light must not be indulged too far,
lest thereby we destroy all law, and leave the decision of every question entirely in
the breast of the judge.”).
30. KAMES, supra note 18, at 132–33 (“In applying the rules of equity to . . .
covenants, what comes first under consideration is, whether the [intent of the
parties] will be fully or fairly taken down in the writing. . . . The sole purpose of
the writing is to bear testimony of [the intent of the parties]; and if that testimony
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Though the common law adhered strictly to the words used in the
parties’ written agreement, some form of equitable relief might be
attained by looking beyond the written words and ascertaining the
31
intentions of the parties. English courts, as well as courts in the
United States, began providing equitable relief in these situations
because people often express their intentions with words used
32
Not every failure of a written
imprecisely and out of context.
agreement to express the intentions of the parties will be afforded
33
equitable relief, however. Failures qualifying for relief must be
rooted in particular judicially recognized grounds, such as that of
34
mistake.
C. Mistake as a Ground for Equitable Relief
“From the time when jurisdiction was first formally delegated
to the Chancellor [of England] by the crown, mistake has played a
most important part [in] . . . the exercise of the jurisdiction in
35
awarding equitable remedies.”
Mistake has long been used by courts exercising their
equitable powers, both in England and in the United States, as a
36
Even
ground to reform or rescind contractual agreements.
prove erroneous, it can avail nothing against the truth. . . . [E]quitable jurisdiction
. . . declares for [the intent of the parties] against every erroneous evidence of
it.”).
31. Id. at 132 (“[I]n common law, the words are strictly adhered to, [but]
such imperfections are remedied by a court of equity. [Equity] admits words and
writings to be the proper evidence of will; but excludes not other evidence.”).
32. Id. at 132–33 (“[C]lauses in writings are sometimes ambiguous or
obscure, sometimes too limited, sometimes too extensive. . . . Sensible that words
and writing are not always accurate, [equitable jurisdiction] endeavors to reach
will . . . however it may differ from the words.”).
33. See, e.g., Gartner v. Eikill, 319 N.W.2d 397, 398 (Minn. 1982) (“The
general rule is that a court may order an agreement rescinded if both parties were
mistaken with respect to facts material to the agreement.”); Nichols v. Shelard
Nat’l Bank, 294 N.W.2d 730, 734 (Minn. 1980) (discussing three elements
necessary for reformation of written instruments).
34. KAMES, supra note 18, at 179 (“[E]quity will afford relief against . . .
error.”).
35. 3 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 838
(Spencer W. Symons ed., 5th ed. 1941) (citations omitted).
36. Id.; see also 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS
ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA § 152 (Isaac F. Redfield ed., 10th ed. 1870)
(“One of the most common classes of cases, in which relief is sought in equity, on
account of a mistake of facts, is that of written agreements, either executory or
executed. Sometimes by mistake, the written agreement contains less than the
parties intended; sometimes it contains more; and sometimes it simply varies from
their intent by expressing something different in substance from the truth of that
intent. In all such cases if the mistake is clearly made out by proofs entirely
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37

before Minnesota’s statehood, in fact, Minnesota courts exercised
equitable jurisdiction to reform or rescind contractual agreements
38
tainted with mistake.
It is not every type of mistake that will give rise to equitable
39
relief, however. Composing an accurate and practical definition
of exactly which types of mistakes are sufficient to justify equitable
relief has troubled courts since the doctrine of relief for mistake
40
In fact, courts have developed various and
first emerged.
sometimes disparate theories that attempt to explain which
41
mistakes equity will relieve. Adding to this judicial fray are cases
of mistake involving similar fact patterns, which have been decided
42
in different ways by courts in different jurisdictions.
Generally speaking, a mistake is “that result of ignorance of
law or of fact which has misled a person to commit that which, if he
43
had not been in error, he would not have done.” Absent fraud or
inequitable conduct, all parties must be mistaken about the same
44
subject matter in order to obtain equitable relief. Additionally,
the types of mistakes which may be relieved through reformation
are different from those which may be relieved through
satisfactory, equity will reform the contract, so as to make it conformable to the
precise intent of the parties. But if the proofs are doubtful and unsatisfactory, and
the mistake is not made entirely plain, equity will withhold relief; upon the
ground, that the written paper ought to be treated as a full and correct expression
of the intent, until the contrary is established beyond reasonable controversy.”).
37. See Swogger v. Taylor, 243 Minn. 458, 463, 68 N.W.2d 376, 381–82 (1955).
The district courts of the territory of Minnesota “were initially vested with, and
exercised, full chancery powers. . . . The territorial act of 1853, abolishing separate
chancery courts and vesting all equity powers in the law courts, did not impair the
court’s inherent equitable powers.” Id. (citing Stone v. Bassett, 4 Minn. 298, 302
(1860)).
The Minnesota State Constitution has preserved this equitable
jurisdiction in Minnesota district courts. See MINN. CONST. art. VI, § 3; Swogger, 243
Minn. at 463, 68 N.W.2d at 382.
38. Buckley v. Patterson, 39 Minn. 250, 252, 39 N.W. 490, 491 (1888) (“It is
well established that a party can be relieved of a contract, founded in his mistake .
. . . And this may be done . . . in an action to correct or cancel.” (citing Benson v.
Markoe, 37 Minn. 30, 33 N.W. 38 (1887))).
39. See 27 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 70:125 (Richard A. Lord ed., 4th ed.).
40. See, e.g., Kowalke v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 79 N.W. 762, 763
(Wis. 1899) (“Indeed, no definition or general rule has been invented which is
sufficient or accurate, except by immediately surrounding it with numerous
exceptions and qualifications more important than itself.”).
41. See Note, Rescission of a Contract for a Mutual Mistake of Fact, 35 HARV. L.
REV. 757, 758 (1922).
42. See Edwin H. Abbot, Jr., Mistake of Fact as a Ground for Affirmative Equitable
Relief, 23 HARV. L. REV. 608, 609–10 (1910).
43. 1 STORY, supra note 36, § 110 n.1.
44. See Blancharel v. Patterson, 64 Minn. 454, 456, 67 N.W. 356, 357 (1896).
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45

rescission.
In order to support the reformation of a written contractual
agreement, a mistake must be made in reducing the parties’
46
In Minnesota, a party seeking the
agreement to writing.
reformation of a written agreement for mistake must show by clear
47
and convincing evidence that three specific elements are satisfied.
First, the party must show that there was a valid agreement between
the parties and that this agreement objectively expressed the
48
Next, the party seeking reformation must
parties’ intentions.
show that the written agreement fails to reflect the parties’ actual
49
agreement. Finally, the party seeking reformation must show that
this failure was due either to a mutual mistake of the parties to the
agreement or to a mistake of one party accompanied by the
50
fraudulent or inequitable conduct of the other party.
To support rescission, a mistake must be mutual and must go
51
to the essence of the subject matter material to the transaction.
In Minnesota, a party seeking rescission of a written contractual
agreement for mutual mistake must show that, at the time of the
parties’ agreement, both parties were mistaken about facts material
52
Additionally, the party seeking rescission
to the agreement.
53
cannot bear the risk of the mistake.

45. See Abbot, supra note 42, at 609–10.
46. Metro Office Parks Co. v. Control Data Corp., 295 Minn. 348, 353, 205
N.W.2d 121, 124 (1973).
47. Nichols v. Shelard Nat’l Bank, 294 N.W.2d 730, 734 (Minn. 1980); see also
Blancharel, 64 Minn. at 456, 67 N.W. at 357.
48. Nichols, 294 N.W.2d at 734.
49. Id. The failure must arise either through a scrivener’s error or through
the failure of the parties’ agreed-upon language to reflect their actual intent. See
Segerstrom v. Holland Piano Mfg. Co., 155 Minn. 50, 52, 192 N.W. 191, 192
(1923). There is no requirement that the written agreement be ambiguous. Metro
Office Parks, 295 Minn. at 353, 205 N.W.2d at 124.
50. Nichols, 294 N.W.2d at 734.
51. See Gartner v. Eikill, 319 N.W.2d 397, 399 (Minn. 1982); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152(1) (1981) (“Where a mistake of both
parties at the time a contract was made as to a basic assumption on which the
contract was made has a material effect on the agreed exchange of performances,
the contract is voidable by the adversely affected party unless he bears the risk of
the mistake . . . .”).
52. Winter v. Skoglund, 404 N.W.2d 786, 793 (Minn. 1987); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152(1) (1981). A fact is material if it goes
to the central nature of the transaction. Gartner, 319 N.W.2d at 399.
53. Winter, 404 N.W.2d at 793 (citing Gartner, 319 N.W.2d at 398–99);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152(1) (1981).
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D. Equitable Relief in Minnesota for Mistakes in Stock Sale Agreements
54

In the 1919 case of Costello v. Sykes, the Minnesota Supreme
Court adopted the bright-line and form-focused rule that stock sale
agreements tainted by mistake may not be rescinded absent fraud
55
or inequitable conduct. Costello involved the sale of the stock of a
56
bank from which bank employees had embezzled large sums. The
bank’s accounting books and records portrayed the bank as having
57
Due to the enormity of the
a book value of $136 per share.
employees’ defalcations, however, the bank actually had a book
58
value of only $60 per share. Apparently, neither the purchaser
59
nor the seller of the bank stock knew about the embezzlement.
The supreme court ruled that the stock sale agreement in Costello
was not tainted by mistake because the buyer got exactly that for
60
The supreme court
which he had bargained: the bank stock.
followed the bright-line and form-focused reasoning from an old
61
English case in setting out the rule that when the sale of corporate
stock is the subject matter of a written agreement, any mutual
mistake about the corporation’s assets and liabilities will not give
rise to rescission absent fraud, concealment of facts, or a mistake as
62
Exactly what rule applies in
to the identity of the stock.
Minnesota to give rise to the reformation of stock sale agreements
for mutual mistakes about corporate assets and liabilities had to
wait for SCI.
III. THE SCI DECISION
SCI Minnesota Funeral Services, Inc. (“SCI”) owned
cemeteries and funeral home businesses with and through its
corporate subsidiaries, including the Crystal Lake Cemetery
63
Crystal Lake owned three
Association (“Crystal Lake”).
64
cemeteries and funeral home businesses, all located in Minnesota.
54. 143 Minn. 109, 172 N.W. 907 (1919).
55. Id. at 114, 172 N.W. at 909.
56. Id. at 111, 172 N.W. at 908.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 112, 172 N.W. at 908.
61. Id. at 111, 172 N.W. at 908 (citing Kennedy v. Pan., N.Z., & Austl. Royal
Mail Co., [1867] 2 L.R.Q.B. 580 (Eng.)).
62. Id. at 111, 114, 172 N.W. at 908–09.
63. SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., Inc. v. Washburn-McReavy Funeral Corp., 795
N.W.2d 855, 858 (Minn. 2011).
64. Id. The three cemetery and funeral home businesses were the Crystal
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Early in 2005, SCI began seeking buyers for several of its businesses,
65
including the businesses held by Crystal Lake. On April 1, 2005,
SCI executed a letter of intent with Corinthian Enterprises, LLC
66
On July 20,
(“Corinthian”) for the sale of several businesses.
2005, SCI sold to Corinthian the several businesses, including those
67
held by Crystal Lake, in part under an asset purchase agreement
68
and in part under a stock purchase agreement. Crystal Lake was
sold pursuant to the stock purchase agreement because SCI and
Corinthian believed that Minnesota law prohibited the direct asset
69
acquisition of cemeteries operated for profit. Corinthian paid $1
70
million for the Crystal Lake stock. On the very same day it made
this purchase, Corinthian turned around and sold to WashburnMcReavy Funeral Corporation (“Washburn”) most of the assets and
71
all of the Crystal Lake stock that it had purchased from SCI.
Lake Cemetery/Crematory in the city of Minneapolis, Dawn Valley Funeral
Home/Memorial Park in the city of Bloomington, and Glen Haven Memorial
Gardens in the city of Crystal. Id.
65. Id.
66. SCI Minn. Funeral Servs. Inc., v. Washburn-McReavy Funeral Corp., No.
19HA-CV-08-1902, 2009 WL 6371879 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Apr. 2, 2009), aff’d, 779
N.W.2d 865 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010), aff’d, 795 N.W.2d 855 (Minn. 2011).
67. Id.
68. Id. The supreme court noted that the Crystal Lake stock purchase was
treated by the parties thereto as an asset sale for tax purposes. SCI Minn. Funeral
Servs., 795 N.W.2d at 858. This means that the parties made an election, provided
for by Internal Revenue Code § 338(h)(10), to treat the stock sale as an asset sale
for federal income tax purposes. This election must be made jointly by both
parties. It is designed to allow the buyer to purchase shares of the target business
and yet apply the purchase price (and assumed liabilities) to “step up” the tax
basis of the target business’s assets. This treatment can benefit the buyer by
increasing the buyer’s near-term tax depreciation and amortization deductions.
The parties are both required to report information regarding the § 338(h)(10)
election, including the aggregate fair value of the assets transferred, to the
Internal Revenue Service. See MARTIN D. GINSBURG & JACK S. LEVIN, MERGERS,
ACQUISITIONS, AND BUYOUTS ¶ 206 (2011). Presumably, both SCI (or SCI’s
ultimate parent) and Washburn-McReavy failed to report any fair value for the two
vacant properties which they had not intended to transfer. Subsequently, and
notwithstanding the stipulation of both parties that they did not know the two
properties were titled to Crystal Lake, additional evidence that the parties’ actual
agreement did not include the two valuable properties is likely to lie within each
party’s federal income tax return(s) that covered the year of the transaction.
69. SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., 795 N.W.2d at 858. The Minnesota Supreme
Court suggests that this conclusion might have been in error. See id. The
Minnesota Court of Appeals, on the other hand, appears to have regarded the
parties’ conclusion as true. See SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., Inc. v. WashburnMcReavy Funeral Corp., 779 N.W.2d 865, 868, 871 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010).
70. SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., 795 N.W.2d at 858.
71. Brief & Appendix of Respondents at 12–13, SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., Inc.
v. Washburn-McReavy Funeral Corp., 795 N.W.2d 855 (No. A09-935).
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Corinthian sold the Crystal Lake stock to Washburn for $1 million
by assigning to Washburn all rights under the stock purchase
72
agreement that Corinthian had just executed with SCI.
The Crystal Lake stock sale agreement between SCI and
Corinthian—the same agreement Corinthian later sold and
assigned to Washburn—specifically listed the three Minnesota
73
cemetery properties held by Crystal Lake which were to be sold.
Unbeknownst to SCI, Corinthian, or Washburn, Crystal Lake also
held title to two vacant properties at the time of the stock sale, one
74
in Minnesota and another in Colorado. At the time SCI sold the
Crystal Lake stock, these properties were worth approximately $2
75
million, twice the amount paid to SCI for the Crystal Lake stock.
Yet, they were not listed alongside the Minnesota cemetery
76
properties in the Crystal Lake stock sale agreement. In fact, none
of the parties intended the transfer of these two properties in the
77
Crystal Lake stock sale.
At some point after the Crystal Lake stock sale was complete,
SCI, believing that it still owned the two vacant properties,
conducted title searches and discovered to its chagrin that Crystal
78
SCI contacted
Lake actually held title to both properties.
Washburn, which was, as yet, apparently unaware that Crystal Lake
held title to the properties, and requested that Washburn quitclaim
79
80
the properties back to SCI. Washburn refused.
SCI then sued Washburn to recover the two properties,
seeking the reformation or, alternatively, the rescission of the
81
Crystal Lake stock sale agreement. The Minnesota District Court,
72. SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., 795 N.W.2d at 858. Washburn paid $6.5 million
in total for all the assets and the Crystal Lake stock. Brief & Appendix of
Respondents at 12–13, SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., Inc. v. Washburn-McReavy
Funeral Corp., 795 N.W.2d 855 (No. A09-935).
73. SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., 795 N.W.2d at 858.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 858–59. The court of appeals noted that the “stock-sale agreement
between SCI and Corinthian provides for ‘[l]egal descriptions of all real property
owned or leased by’ Crystal Lake, and the descriptions therein do not include the
Burnsville and Colorado parcels.” SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., Inc. v. WashburnMcReavy Funeral Corp., 779 N.W.2d 865, 869 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010) (emphasis
added) (quoting the stock sale agreement), aff’d, 795 N.W.2d 855 (Minn. 2011).
77. SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., 795 N.W.2d at 859.
78. SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., 779 N.W.2d at 869.
79. SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., 795 N.W.2d at 859.
80. SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., 779 N.W.2d at 869.
81. SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., 795 N.W.2d at 859. Both SCI and Corinthian
sued Washburn. For all practical purposes, however, SCI was the party truly
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in summary judgment, held that SCI was not entitled to relief
82
The district court
through either reformation or rescission.
concluded that reformation was not available for the stock sale
agreement by analyzing the reformation claim under the
83
traditional elements required by Minnesota case law. Then, citing
Costello as precedent, the district court held that rescission was also
not available to SCI for the stock sale agreement because “[u]nder
Minnesota law, the stock sale of a corporation transfers all of the
84
assets and liabilities unless specifically excluded.” A divided court
of appeals affirmed but went further than the district court and
extended the bright-line and form-focused rule from Costello to the
85
reformation of stock sale agreements. SCI appealed these losses
86
to the Minnesota Supreme Court.
In SCI, the Minnesota Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding in
Costello, reasoning that a mutual mistake about a corporation’s
assets and liabilities is not “‘of such a character as to give rise to a
87
right to rescind,’” as long as the “‘means of information are open
88
alike to both and there is no concealment of facts or imposition.’”
89
Such a mistake, the court stated, “is one of value.” The supreme
court also affirmed the district court’s reasoning under Costello that
“[u]nder Minnesota law, the stock sale of a corporation transfers all of
90
the assets and liabilities unless specifically excluded.” Once the court
reaffirmed these rules from Costello, it stated simply that “Costello
91
bars rescission in this case.”
interested in obtaining equitable relief. This article will reflect this state of affairs
by merely referring to SCI as the party in suit seeking relief.
82. Id.
83. SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., Inc. v. Washburn-McReavy Funeral Corp., No.
19HA-CV-08-1902, 2009 WL 6371879, at *A.9 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Apr. 2, 2009), aff’d,
779 N.W.2d 865 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010), aff’d, 795 N.W.2d 855 (Minn. 2011).
84. Id.
85. See SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., 795 N.W.2d at 864.
86. Id. at 859.
87. Id. at 862 (quoting Costello v. Sykes, 143 Minn. 109, 111, 172 N.W. 907,
908 (1919)).
88. Id. (quoting Costello, 143 Minn. at 114, 172 N.W. at 909).
89. Id.
90. SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., Inc. v. Washburn-McReavy Funeral Corp., No.
19HA-CV-08-1902, 2009 WL 6371879 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Apr. 2, 2009) (emphasis
added), aff’d, 779 N.W.2d 865 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010), aff’d, 795 N.W.2d 855 (Minn.
2011); see SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., 795 N.W.2d at 859 (affirming the district court’s
decision that SCI was “not entitled to rescission based on mutual mistake because a
stock sale transfers all assets and liabilities unless specifically excluded” (emphasis
added)).
91. SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., 795 N.W.2d at 862. SCI argued that Costello
should be overruled in the face of contrary case law from other jurisdictions, such
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When it came to reformation for mutual mistake, however, the
supreme court began by expressly disavowing the bright-line and
form-focused rule from Costello, apparently summarily overruling
the court of appeals’ extension of Costello to the reformation of
92
The supreme court then recalled its
stock sale agreements.
precedent for prima facie cases of reformation, concluding that
this precedent should still apply in the context of stock sale
93
agreements. In applying this precedent, however, the supreme
court produced essentially the same bright-line and form-focused
analysis as in Costello to bar any equitable relief for stock sale
94
agreements. Instead of relying upon Costello’s rule that a court
will not look within the corporate form for mutual mistake in a
stock sale agreement, the supreme court reasoned in SCI that there
was no mutual mistake supporting relief through reformation
because “under Minnesota law, when a business sells and transfers
as Clayburg v. Whitt, 171 N.W.2d 623 (Iowa 1969). Id. at 863. Clayburg “rejected
‘the proposition that the existence or non-existence of corporate assets is
immaterial[,]’” holding “‘it was proper for the court to look beyond the form of
the asset transferred (corporate stock) to the substance of the transfer (corporate
assets and liabilities) in deciding whether there was a mutual mistake such as
would justify refusing enforcement or rescission of the contract.’” Id. (quoting
Clayburg, 171 N.W.2d at 626). The court in SCI responded that it would not
overrule its precedent (Costello) unless it was “‘contrary to principles of equity,
[was] at odds with some of our statements in’ other cases and did not promote
good public policy.” Id. at 863 n.5 (quoting Cargill, Inc. v. Ace Am. Ins. Co., 784
N.W.2d 341, 352–54 (Minn. 2010)).
92. Id. at 865 (“When the relief seeks to void the entire contract, the
additional analysis from Costello . . . applies. But we have never used that additional
analysis in the reformation context, where the relief does not seek to unwind the
transaction but simply to modify it to reflect the parties’ actual intention. We
likewise decline to do so here.” (citation omitted)).
93. Id. (“A party seeking reformation must prove that: ‘(1) there was a valid
agreement between the parties expressing their real intentions; (2) the written
instrument failed to express the real intentions of the parties; and (3) this failure
was due to a mutual mistake of the parties, or a unilateral mistake accompanied by
fraud or inequitable conduct by the other party.’” (quoting Nichols v. Shelard
Nat’l Bank, 294 N.W.2d 730, 734 (Minn. 1980))).
94. Regarding the equitable rescission of stock sale agreements for mutual
mistake, the supreme court found the rule from Costello to be that “a sale of
corporate stock may not be ‘rescinded merely because both parties were mistaken
about the nature or extent of the assets or liabilities of the corporation’ as long as
the ‘means of information are open alike to both and there is no concealment of
facts or imposition.’” Id. at 862 (quoting Costello v. Sykes, 143 Minn. 109, 114, 172
N.W. 907, 909 (1919)). Regarding the equitable reformation of stock sale
agreements for mutual mistake, the court noted, “‘When a business is sold
through a stock transfer, the buyer assumes not only the assets of the corporation,
but also the liabilities. This greater risk justifies greater protection for the stock
purchaser.’” Id. at 866 (quoting Specialized Tours, Inc. v. Hagen, 392 N.W.2d 520,
536 (Minn. 1986)).
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all of its stock, it is selling all of its assets and liabilities, unless the
95
The supreme court then
business has expressed otherwise.”
proceeded to explain that principles of Minnesota agency law, as
applied to a corporation under Minnesota corporate law,
constructively imputed knowledge of the two vacant properties to
96
SCI. This imputation, the court concluded, caused any mistake
about the two properties to be, “as a matter of law,” a unilateral
mistake—a mistake that does not qualify for relief through
97
reformation.
Even though the supreme court found that SCI and Washburn
98
agreed on all material facts at the time of the lawsuit, were both
unaware that Crystal Lake held title to the two vacant properties at
99
the time of the sale, and did not intend to include those
100
properties in the sale, the court refused to look beyond the form
of the stock sale when determining whether to exercise its
101
Accordingly, the
equitable powers for a mutual mistake.
supreme court’s unanimous holding in SCI is that the parties to a
stock sale agreement cannot, as a matter of law, obtain equitable
relief through reformation for a mutual mistake about corporate
assets and liabilities in the absence of fraud or inequitable
102
In essence, SCI rules that if parties engage in the
conduct.
transfer of a business through a stock sale, the form of the sale
controls to bar equitable relief for mutual mistake because the
court will not look through the corporate form to the substance of
what the parties intended to transfer in the sale.

95. Id. at 866.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 858.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 859.
101. Id. at 867 (“[T]he undisputed evidence establishes that appellants cannot
prove that the stock sale agreement failed to express the true intentions of the
parties because of a mutual mistake.”).
102. It is to this reasoning that, the dissent in the court of appeals decision
argues:
[I]f form is always put over substance, any remedy available for mutual
mistake would be placed out of the reach of those who would otherwise
be entitled to one. A court should not abstain from applying mutualmistake analysis simply because the underlying transaction was for
corporate stock rather than another kind of asset.
SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., Inc. v. Washburn-McReavy Funeral Corp., 779 N.W.2d
865, 878 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010) (Worke, J., dissenting), aff’d, 795 N.W.2d 855
(Minn. 2011).
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE SCI DECISION
Form-over-substance permeates the entire SCI decision. In
SCI, the Minnesota Supreme Court began its reasoning on the right
track by expressly refusing to apply “the additional analysis from
103
Costello, which focuses on the form . . . of the transaction” outside
the realm of the rescission of stock sale agreements. Moreover, the
supreme court properly invoked the traditional elements of
contract reformation from prior Minnesota cases. Notwithstanding
this express rejection of a bright-line focus on form in the context
of the reformation of a stock sale agreement, however, the supreme
court proceeded to apply these traditional elements of reformation
by simply reverting back to a bright-line focus on form. The court
accomplished this complete contradiction by applying the elements
of reformation from the perspective of a corporation’s separate
and distinct legal status. The court did this in such a manner as to
ensure that, as a matter of law, virtually no stock sale agreements
can be reformed for mutual mistake.
Strangely, nowhere in SCI does the supreme court comment
on this rather obvious reversion to a bright-line focus on corporate
form and the striking similarity of the rules it fashioned in SCI with
the bright-line and form-focused rule from Costello. The dissent in
SCI at the Minnesota Court of Appeals was quite prescient to
remark that “if form is always put over substance, any remedy
104
available for mutual mistake would be placed out of . . . reach,"
because of the contradictory reasoning of the supreme court and
the court's reversion to a bright-line focus on corporate form.
The analysis that follows is divided into four parts, each of
which illustrates in greater detail the supreme court’s confused and
contradictory reasoning in SCI. First, the analysis evaluates how
prior Minnesota case law illustrates the Minnesota Supreme Court’s
fractured and confusing approach to looking through the
corporate form where mutual mistake taints a stock sale
105
Second, the analysis scrutinizes the supreme court’s
agreement.
focus on the corporate form as the subject matter of a stock sale
agreement to bolster its reasoning in SCI under the second
103. SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., 795 N.W.2d at 865 (citing Costello v. Sykes, 143
Minn. 109, 111, 172 N.W. 907, 908 (1919)).
104. SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., 779 N.W.2d at 878 (Worke, J., dissenting); see also
Garrey v. Nelson, 185 Minn. 487, 489, 242 N.W. 12, 13 (1932) (“In equity the court
adapts its relief to exigencies of the case in hand, and in so doing form always gives
way to substance.”).
105. See infra Part IV.A.
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106

traditional element for reformation.
This section of the analysis
compares and contrasts the supreme court’s approach in SCI with
another area where Minnesota courts routinely look beyond the
corporate form when determining whether to exercise their
equitable powers: piercing the corporate veil. Third, the analysis
dissects the supreme court’s reliance in SCI on bright-line and
form-focused principles of corporate and agency law to
constructively impute to a corporate stock seller knowledge that
guarantees a unilateral mistake under the third traditional element
107
This section of the analysis compares and
for reformation.
contrasts the supreme court’s approach in SCI with the more
nuanced approach of prior Minnesota case law to constructive
knowledge where the relief sought is equitable. Finally, the analysis
108
argues that SCI was probably a result-oriented decision.
A. Minnesota’s Fractured and Confusing History of Looking Through the
Corporate Form for Mistake
Four years before its holding in Costello, the Minnesota
109
Supreme Court decided Drake v. Fairmont Drain Tile & Brick Co.,
another case involving a stock sale agreement. In Drake, the
plaintiff contracted to buy shares of stock in a corporation involved
110
The plaintiff was induced
in the manufacture of clay drain tiles.
to purchase the stock by the defendant seller’s representations
111
When
about a clay deposit on land owned by the corporation.
the parties entered into the stock sale agreement, they both
believed that the clay deposit was of a quality high enough to be
112
Several months after the
used in the manufacture of drain tiles.
plaintiff paid for the stock, both parties discovered that the clay
113
The
deposit was not of the quality required for drain tiles.
114
The
plaintiff sued for rescission of the stock sale agreement.
supreme court rescinded the agreement, concluding that both
parties, innocent of the identical belief regarding the quality of the
clay deposit, “were mutually mistaken upon the very same essentials
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part IV.C.
See infra Part IV.D.
129 Minn. 145, 151 N.W. 914 (1915).
Id. at 146, 151 N.W. at 915.
Id. at 146–47, 151 N.W. at 915.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 146, 151 N.W. at 915.
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115

of the contract.” The supreme court’s view of mistake in Drake is
consistent with section 151 of the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts which states that “mistake is a belief that is not in accord
116
with the facts.”
In Drake, the supreme court rescinded the stock sale
agreement due to the parties’ mutual mistake about the assets of
the corporation whose stock was the subject matter of the
agreement. Four years later in Costello, however, the supreme court
abruptly refused to look for the parties’ actual agreement because
the court thought it to be beyond the “identity or existence” of the
117
The supreme court found in both
corporate stock being sold.
Drake and Costello that the parties to the stock sale agreements were
118
Nevertheless, the
mutually mistaken about corporate assets.
supreme court reasoned quite differently between the two cases,
reaching opposite results. Quite remarkably, Costello neither
distinguished nor specifically overruled Drake. Costello, in fact,
never even mentioned Drake. The question arises, therefore,
whether these cases may be reconciled, or whether Costello, having
been decided later, implicitly overruled Drake.
In both Drake and Costello, the parties negotiated for corporate
119
In both cases
assets about which they were mutually mistaken.
the buyer, rather than the seller, was the party seeking equitable
relief. No material differences are evident between the two cases.
Whether or not Drake and Costello can be reconciled, the supreme
court explained in SCI that stare decisis required it to follow the
reasoning in Costello for the rescission of stock sale agreements.
115. Id. at 150–51, 151 N.W. at 916.
116. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 151 (1981).
117. Costello v. Sykes, 143 Minn. 109, 111, 172 N.W. 907, 908 (1919).
118. Id. at 111, 172 N.W. at 908 (“The parties to the sale were mutually
mistaken as to the assets of the bank, the actual value and the book value of its
stock, and the amount of its surplus and undivided profits.”); Drake, 129 Minn. at
150, 151 N.W. at 917 (“Both [parties] acted upon a supposed state of facts which
did not exist. They were mutually mistaken upon the very same essentials of the
contract. The mind of neither met upon an actual existing condition or state of
facts.”).
119. We are told that the parties in Drake spoke specifically about the quality of
the corporate asset about which they were later found to be mutually mistaken.
Drake, 129 Minn. at 146, 151 N.W. at 915. In fact, the buyer and the seller
probably negotiated about it. Moreover, we are not told that the parties in Costello
ever spoke specifically about the quality of the assets in the corporation, with
which the corporation’s employees had secretly absconded. Presumably they did,
however, because the court found that the buyer bought ten shares for $136 per
share because the books and records of the corporation showed that each share of
stock was worth $136. Costello, 143 Minn. at 110, 172 N.W. at 908.
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Accordingly, it should be safe to assume that, after SCI, the rule
from Drake regarding rescission has now been implicitly overruled.
The bright-line and form-focused rule from Costello applies to the
rescission of stock sale agreements. That said, however, why
doesn’t the concept survive from Drake that a court should look
beyond the mere identity or existence of a corporation’s stock and
into the essence of the parties’ transaction where the relief sought
is not rescission but reformation? In fact, this concept clearly
should survive in light of the following statement made by the
supreme court in SCI that bright-line and form-focused reasoning
should not be used when a Minnesota court weighs whether or not
to reform a written contractual agreement:
When the relief seeks to void the entire contract, the
additional analysis from Costello, which focuses on the
form or subject matter of the transaction that the [party]
seeks to undo (i.e., a stock sale), applies. But we have never
used that additional analysis in the reformation context, where
the relief does not seek to unwind the transaction but
simply to modify it to reflect the parties’ actual intention.
120
We likewise decline to do so here.
Initially, the supreme court charted the proper course in SCI by
invoking the traditional elements of reformation espoused by prior
Minnesota case law. Shortly after invoking this precedent, however,
the supreme court’s reasoning careened back toward that which it
had just expressly rejected—Costello. The court became hopelessly
and unfortunately ensnared in a bright-line focus on formal
principles that view a corporation as a formally separate and
distinct entity.
After assuming that the first traditional element for
reformation had been met—that the parties had an actual
agreement—the supreme court proceeded to reason about both
the second and third elements traditionally required for
reformation. It was here that the supreme court was apprehended
by these principles of corporate and agency law.

120. SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., Inc. v. Washburn-McReavy Funeral Corp., 795
N.W.2d 855, 865 (Minn. 2011) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2011

19

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 3

2011]

THERE CAN BE NO MISTAKE

479

B. The Second Element for Reformation: Focus on Corporate Form
1. The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Rejection and Resurrection of
Costello’s Reasoning
Under Minnesota law, the second traditional element that a
party must prove when seeking to reform a written contractual
agreement is that the written agreement fails to express the
121
In SCI, the
objectively manifested intentions of the parties.
Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that the stock sale agreement
reflected the true intentions of the parties “[b]ecause SCI had the
right to exclude the vacant lots under the plain terms of the stock
122
Notably, the court
sale agreement, as a matter of law . . . .”
buttresses its conclusion that the stock sale agreement reflected the
true intentions of the parties with the phrase “as a matter of law.”
This phrase is, presumably, a direct reference to the court’s true
reasoning—its application of Minnesota corporate law, which
immediately precedes this conclusion.
In the several sentences immediately preceding its conclusion
that the stock sale agreement in SCI reflected the true intentions of
the parties, the supreme court expounded upon the effect of
Minnesota corporate law on the transfer of assets and liabilities in a
123
stock sale. In particular, the court pointed out that the stock sale
agreement reflected the true intentions of the parties because
“under Minnesota law, when a business sells and transfers all of its stock,
it is selling all of its assets and liabilities unless the business has expressed
124
This reasoning merely refocused the court on the
otherwise.”
form or subject matter of the agreement—a stock sale. Moreover,
this reasoning led to the court’s conclusion that the second
traditional element for reformation was not met. In contrast to this
reasoning, and only five brief paragraphs earlier in the SCI
decision, the supreme court stated unequivocally that “the
additional analysis from Costello . . . focuses on the form or subject matter
of the transaction that the [party] seeks to undo (i.e., a stock sale).
But we have never used that additional analysis in the reformation
125
Yet, like a phoenix from the ashes, the supreme
context . . . .”
court uses principles of Minnesota corporate law to resurrect the
121. Nichols v. Shelard Nat’l Bank, 294 N.W.2d 730, 734 (Minn. 1980)
(referring to the “real intentions” of the parties).
122. SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., 795 N.W.2d at 866.
123. Id.
124. Id. (emphasis added).
125. Id. at 865 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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essential bright-line and form-focused reasoning from Costello in the
context of reformation.
This reversion to a bright-line focus on form is further
revealed by the supreme court’s characterization of the district
court’s analysis regarding rescission, affirmed by both the court of
appeals and the supreme court: “The [district] court, relying on
Costello v. Sykes . . . held that appellants were not entitled to
rescission based on mutual mistake because a stock sale transfers all
126
assets and liabilities unless specifically excluded.” This language, used
by the supreme court to explain how the district court applied
Costello in the rescission context, is nearly indistinguishable from
the language used by the supreme court to buttress its conclusion
127
that the second traditional element for reformation was not met.
Simply stated, in SCI, the supreme court used the identical
reasoning to prevent relief through reformation that Costello used
to prevent relief through rescission—namely, that under Minnesota
law, a stock sale transfers all assets and liabilities not specifically
excluded by the parties’ agreement. This reasoning directly
contradicts the supreme court’s express disavowal of Costello in the
reformation context. As a result, after SCI, the mode of analysis for
equitable relief in the context of a stock sale agreement is
essentially the same in Minnesota regardless of whether the relief
sought is rescission or reformation. If this is the state of affairs that
the supreme court was aiming to achieve through SCI, the law in
Minnesota would have been made much more simple if the
supreme court had merely affirmed the court of appeals’ extension
of Costello to reformation. Extending Costello to reformation would
have yielded the same result as that from SCI because both modes
of analysis preclude relief for the same reason: Minnesota courts
will not look through the corporate form when determining
whether to exercise their equitable powers of reformation, absent
fraud or inequitable conduct. The supreme court’s holding in SCI
is, therefore, rooted directly within that which it had also ostensibly
rejected: bright-line and form-focused principles of corporate
128
law.

126. Id. at 859 (emphasis added).
127. See id. at 866 (“[U]nder Minnesota law, when a business sells and transfers all
of its stock, it is selling all of its assets and liabilities unless the business has expressed
otherwise.”) (emphasis added).
128. Id. at 865 (“When the relief seeks to void the entire contract, the
additional analysis from Costello, which focuses on the form or subject matter of
the transaction that the [party] seeks to undue (i.e., a stock sale), applies.”).
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The corporate form is not, however, impermeable to equity’s
purview. Courts in Minnesota have long looked through the
corporate form when determining whether to exercise their
129
Specifically, Minnesota courts are regularly
equitable powers.
called upon to look through the corporate form and to the facts
and circumstances within the corporation in order to determine
whether to use their equitable powers to impose liability on
shareholders for corporate obligations. This judicial practice is
130
referred to as determining whether to “pierce the corporate veil.”
Analogizing to this judicial practice is useful to question the lengths
to which the supreme court goes in SCI to keep from looking
through the corporate form where the relief sought was equitable.
2. Looking Through the Corporate Form To Determine Whether To
Exercise Equitable Powers: Piercing the Corporate Veil
A mainstay principle of corporate law is that the owners of a
corporation, generally called “shareholders,” are not liable for the
131
A corollary to this
debts or obligations of the corporation.
principle is that a corporation is an entity formally separate and
132
These two concepts are, in fact,
distinct from its shareholders.
two sides of a single coin: the policy of limited shareholder liability
is a fundamental reason why a corporation is considered to be an
133
Any
entity formally separate and distinct from its shareholders.
129. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. A. Enkema Holding Co., 196 Minn.
154, 157–58, 264 N.W. 576, 578 (1936) (indicating that a court will disregard a
corporation’s separate fictional legal existence where continuing regard of the
corporate form would advance fraud or inequity).
130. See Hoyt Props., Inc. v. Prod. Res. Grp., LLC, 736 N.W.2d 313, 318 (Minn.
2007) (“A court may pierce the corporate veil to hold a shareholder liable for the
debts of the corporation . . . .”).
131. 4 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS § 1556 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2010) (“Today, corporation statutes in
all jurisdictions provide that shareholders are not liable to the corporation or its
creditors except to the extent of any unpaid consideration for their shares, unless
the shareholder becomes personally liable by reason of the shareholder’s acts or
conduct.”).
132. Id. § 25.
133. See 114 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D Establishing Elements for Disregarding
Corporate Entity and Piercing Entity’s Veil § 403 (2011) (“A fundamental principle of
Anglo-American law is that a [corporation] . . . is separate and distinct from its
owners . . . . Consequently, the liability of an [owner] for the obligations of an
entity is limited to [the owner’s] interest in the entity. This concept of limited
liability has been called the most attractive feature of [the] corporation.”)
(emphasis added); John H. Matheson, The Limits of Business Limited Liability: Entity
Veil Piercing and Successor Liability Doctrines, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 411, 413
(2004) (“Businesses and their owners regularly seek to limit the scope of their
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effort, therefore, by a court applying equitable principles to impose
corporate liabilities on the shareholders of the corporation is in
derogation of the fundamental principle of corporate law that a
corporation is separate and distinct from its shareholders.
We find, nonetheless, that courts do look through the separate
and distinct status of a corporation when called upon to determine
whether to exercise their equitable powers and impose corporate
134
When a court does exercise its
liabilities on shareholders.
equitable powers to impose corporate liabilities on shareholders,
135
In order to
the court is said to be “piercing the corporate veil.”
actually pierce the veil and impose liability, however, particular
circumstances must exist: either fraud must be present or the
136
corporation must be merely an alter ego of its shareholders.
Minnesota courts will look through the corporate form to
determine whether to pierce the corporate veil regardless of
137
Notably, fraud is not a necessary
whether fraud is involved.
element to pierce the corporate veil where the shareholders have
138
In the absence of fraud,
used the corporation as their alter ego.
however, Minnesota courts require that “some element of injustice
or fundamental unfairness” would result if the corporate veil were
139
It is true that in circumstances where Minnesota
not pierced.
courts will pierce the corporate veil in the absence of fraud, the
corporate shareholders have generally tried to have their cake and
140
Nevertheless, this practice illustrates that Minnesota
eat it too.
liabilities . . . . There are two distinct ways in which these business liabilities may be
limited. First, entrepreneurs may take advantage of various state laws to create
some form of limited liability entity under which the business will operate. These
entities, such as traditional corporations . . . have a legal existence separate from
the owner of the business and presumptively shield the owner from personal
obligation for the business debts. In the business context, this might be referred
to as ‘entity-based limited liability.’”).
134. See Roepke v. W. Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co., 302 N.W.2d 350, 352 (Minn. 1981)
(explaining that the concept of piercing the corporate veil involves ignoring the
corporation as a “distinct entity” and is a concept “equitable in nature”).
135. Piercing the corporate veil is a judicially created exception to a
corporation’s separate and distinct existence, created through the court’s equity
powers. FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW § 1.5.1, at 69 (2d ed. 2010).
136. Victoria Elevator Co. v. Meriden Grain Co., 283 N.W.2d 509, 512 (Minn.
1979).
137. Id.
138. Id. (“[W]e have never explicitly held that fraud is a necessary element.”).
139. Id. (“[In the absence of fraud,] there [must] be an element of injustice or
fundamental unfairness.”).
140. See, e.g., Mfrs. Bldg., Inc. v. Heller, 306 Minn. 180, 183, 235 N.W.2d 825,
827 (1975) (holding that piercing the corporate veil was appropriate in the
absence of fraud where the corporation was used by the shareholders as merely a
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courts regularly and unhesitatingly look through the corporate
form in order to determine whether to exercise their equitable
powers.
3. Not Looking Through the Corporate Form To Determine Whether
To Exercise Equitable Powers: SCI’s Approach To Reformation
If Minnesota courts will, even in the absence of fraud, look
through a corporation’s formally separate and distinct status when
determining whether they will exercise their equitable powers to
impose corporate liabilities on shareholders, why did the supreme
court in SCI refuse to look through the corporate form when
determining whether to exercise its equitable powers of
reformation? Why, in light of the fact that the parties in SCI
stipulated to agreed-upon facts that exuded injustice and
fundamental unfairness, did the court in SCI summarily take refuge
in bright-line legal principles rooted in a corporation’s formally
separate and distinct status?
Unfortunately, the supreme court failed in SCI to provide any
deeper reasoning with which to answer these questions. It failed to
offer any rationale for its patent application of these bright-line and
form-focused principles. An unstated reason may be provided by
the supreme court in Costello. There, the supreme court stated that
it would not disregard a corporation’s formally separate status
when determining whether to exercise its equitable powers of
rescission because the court was not “inclined to open up a new
141
In light of the preceding discussion of
field for litigation.”
piercing the corporate veil, this rationale from Costello has merit
because the issue of piercing the corporate veil is “one of the most
142
It is an area “all too
frequently litigated in all of corporate law.”
often characterized by ambiguity, unpredictability, and . . .
143
randomness,” which stems from the unpredictable application
and inconsistent articulation of the rules applicable to the practice
of looking through the corporate form to determine whether to
pierce the corporate veil. If the supreme court feared opening up
convenient depository and conduit for holding rental property).
141. Costello v. Sykes, 143 Minn. 109, 113, 172 N.W. 907, 909 (1919).
142. Stephen B. Presser, The Bogalusa Explosion, “Single Business Enterprise,”
“Alter Ego,” and Other Errors: Academics, Economics, Democracy, and Shareholder Limited
Liability: Back Towards a Unitary “Abuse” Theory of Piercing the Corporate Veil, 100 NW.
U. L. REV. 405, 411 (2006).
143. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J. CORP. L. 479, 507
(2001).
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a new field for litigation in SCI by looking through the corporate
form in order to determine whether to exercise its equitable
powers of reformation, the court’s fear would be quite justified.
The supreme court never offers this as a rationale in SCI, however.
Moreover, the fact that the supreme court goes out of its way to
expressly reject the bright-line and form-focused reasoning from
Costello, where the relief sought is reformation, strongly suggests
that this is not the rationale underlying the court’s holding in SCI.
If the supreme court had truly feared creating a new breeding
ground for litigation through its decision in SCI, the court would
have more effectively prevented such a possibility by simply
affirming the court of appeals’ extension of the rule from Costello to
144
the reformation of stock sale agreements.
The confused approach of SCI renders the supreme court’s
express rejection of Costello in the reformation context effectively
superfluous. As such, SCI’s approach invites future litigation. This
is evident by comparing the mode of analysis used in Costello with
that used in SCI. Costello’s mode of analysis is simple and
straightforward. It occurs all in one step: no equitable relief is
allowed for a stock sale agreement, absent fraud or inequitable
145
SCI’s
conduct, because the subject matter being sold is stock.
mode of analysis, on the other hand, is vague and internally
contradictory. It occurs in at least two steps: first, the traditional
elements of reformation are applied and then formal principles of
146
This approach provides a
corporate and agency law are applied.
breeding ground for litigation. Future mistaken parties to stock
sale agreements will doubtlessly litigate in order to show that their
facts are somehow different from those of SCI. Perhaps the
unintended transfer of liabilities, rather than assets, will be at issue
in future cases. In addition, buyers, rather than sellers, may be the
parties seeking relief.
Moreover, mistaken parties to an
unincorporated business sale agreement, such as an agreement to
sell a limited liability company, may litigate whether SCI’s brightline and form-focused reasoning extends to unincorporated
business entities. Finally, future mistaken parties to stock sale
agreements will be forced to litigate in order to clarify the true
import of the vague and internally contradictory reasoning in SCI.
144. See SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., Inc. v. Washburn-McReavy Funeral Corp.,
779 N.W.2d 865, 871–72 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010).
145. See Costello, 143 Minn. at 114, 172 N.W. at 909.
146. SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., Inc. v. Washburn-McReavy Funeral Corp., 795
N.W.2d 855, 865–67 (Minn. 2011).
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C. The Third Element for Reformation: When Constructive Knowledge
Leads To Unilateral Mistake
1. Minnesota’s Nuanced Approach To Constructive Knowledge
where Equitable Relief Is Sought
Under Minnesota case law, the third element that a party must
prove when seeking to reform a written contractual agreement is
that the written agreement’s failure to express the true intentions
of the parties is the result of a mutual mistake—a mistake of both
147
In SCI, the Minnesota Supreme Court
parties to the agreement.
concluded that any mistake made regarding the two properties was
unilateral, rather than mutual, because “it was SCI that failed to
148
The court explained that
remove the lots from the transaction.”
it was again using Minnesota corporate law to anchor its reasoning,
concluding that “under general corporate law principles, a
corporation is charged with constructive knowledge . . . of all
149
material facts” of which its agents have knowledge. The court
also rationalized that because some SCI employees had, at some
point in the past, known about the two properties, Minnesota law
thereby imputed those employees’ knowledge to “the entire
150
It is true that the law of agency imputes knowledge
company.”
from an agent, such as an employee, to the principal, such as the
151
Moreover, a corporate agent’s knowledge can be
employer.
imputed to the corporation collectively with the knowledge of
152
The supreme court’s enthusiasm in SCI
other corporate agents.
for these formal principles of corporate and agency law is
misplaced, however, in light of the court’s complete failure to
grapple with the more nuanced approach that Minnesota case law
has taken to constructive knowledge where the relief sought is
equitable.
147. E.g., Nichols v. Shelard Nat’l Bank, 294 N.W.2d 730, 734 (Minn. 1980).
148. SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., 795 N.W.2d at 866.
149. Id. at 866 (quoting Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bloomington Steel & Supply
Co., 718 N.W.2d 888, 895–96 (Minn. 2006)) (internal quotations omitted).
150. Id.
151. A major consequence of a corporation’s separate and distinct status is
that a corporation can act only through its agents, such as employees or directors
of the corporation. See Save Our Creeks v. City of Brooklyn Park, 699 N.W.2d 307,
309 (Minn. 2005) (“[A] corporation is an artificial entity which can only act
through agents.” (quoting Nicollet Restoration, Inc. v. Turnham, 486 N.W.2d 753,
754 (Minn. 1992))) (emphasis added). As a result, the law of agency applies to
govern the relations between and among a corporation, its agents, and third
parties.
152. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03 cmt. c (2006).
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153

In Gartner v. Eikill, the Minnesota Supreme Court explained
that “[t]he failure of a party to investigate” will not always result in
154
The court in
a unilateral mistake precluding equitable relief.
Gartner took a nuanced approach to how parties to an agreement
bear the risk of their lack of knowledge or their failure to obtain
knowledge through adequate investigation. There, the supreme
court held that the parties to a commercial real estate transaction
were mutually mistaken where they both believed the land being
155
The purchaser
sold was zoned for general commercial use.
undertook some investigation of the land’s zoning status but
somehow failed to discover that it was not zoned as both parties
156
In Gartner, the supreme court
understood it to be zoned.
expressly rejected the defendant-respondent’s invitation to
constructively impute knowledge of the land’s true zoning status to
157
Moreover, the court based its reasoning
the plaintiff-appellant.
158
on prior Minnesota case law as well as on the California Supreme
159
Court’s reasoning in Hannah v. Steinman, a case in which all
parties to a lease were unaware of a local leasehold ordinance. In
Hannah, the parties could have discovered the ordinance if they
160
Similarly, the court in Gartner
had inquired with the city.
reasoned that the parties’ lack of knowledge was a mutual mistake,
noting that “‘[w]e cannot believe that the equitable rules relative to
mistake should be so narrowly construed as to require us to hold
that this mistake did not go to the very essence of the contract
161
between these parties.’”
2. SCI’s Disregard of Minnesota’s Nuanced Approach To
Constructive Knowledge
In SCI, the facts are devoid of any indication that SCI
undertook a search for all properties titled to Crystal Lake prior to

153. 319 N.W.2d 397 (Minn. 1982).
154. Id. at 399 (“The failure of a party to investigate, however, will not always
preclude rescission.” (citing RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 508 (1932))).
155. Id. at 400.
156. Id. at 398.
157. Id. at 399–400.
158. Id. at 399 (“In Lindquist v. Gibbs, 122 Minn. 205, 142 N.W. 156 (1913), and
Thwing v. Hall & Ducey Lumber Co., 40 Minn. 184, 41 N.W. 815 (1889), for
example, this court ordered rescission of contracts for the sale of land under
circumstances in which the buyer could have discovered the mistake.”).
159. 112 P. 1094 (Cal. 1911).
160. Id. at 1095.
161. Gartner, 319 N.W.2d at 400 (quoting Hannah, 112 P. at 1098).
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the stock sale. SCI may have failed to undertake any such
investigation, whereas in Gartner the parties did undertake some
investigation—just not enough to discover the mistake. The
supreme court’s holding in SCI fails to make this distinction
between some diligence and no diligence, however. Instead, the
court simply imputes knowledge per se to SCI, stating that because
“Minnesota law imputes . . . knowledge [of the two properties] to
the entire company, SCI could have removed the vacant lots from
162
the sale. . . . [T]herefore, any mistake was a unilateral mistake.”
Relying on the conclusion that any mistake regarding the two
properties was made unilaterally by SCI because SCI bore the risk
of the mistake, the supreme court barred SCI from obtaining
equitable relief through reformation because the third traditional
163
Under the third
element for reformation could not be met.
traditional element, a party seeking reformation cannot have made
a unilateral mistake unless the other party knew about the mistake
164
or acted fraudulently. Accordingly, the supreme court’s decision
to ascribe knowledge of the properties to SCI, thereby saddling SCI
with the risk of removing the properties before sale, is a departure
from, as well as a complete failure to grapple with, Minnesota’s
much more nuanced approach to constructive knowledge where
the relief sought is equitable, as illustrated by Gartner. Simply
stated, this failure further illustrates how the supreme court in SCI
effectively continued to adhere to the bright-line focus on form
from Costello.
Where a party to a stock sale agreement is seeking to reform
that agreement, the Minnesota Supreme Court’s holding in SCI will
charge that party with knowledge—“as a matter of law”—of all
assets and liabilities of which any agent of that party has or had
knowledge while working in the scope of his or her agency
165
Therefore, sellers who have negotiated with a buyer for
duties.
an exact mix of assets and liabilities to be sold through a stock sale
agreement where any agent of the seller is or was aware of assets
titled to the corporation to be sold that are not part of the sale
agreement will almost never be able to obtain relief through
reformation if that agreement is tainted with a mistake of both
162. SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., Inc. v. Washburn-McReavy Funeral Corp., 795
N.W.2d 855, 866 (Minn. 2011) (citation omitted).
163. Id. (“Any mistake here regarding the vacant lots was SCI’s mistake alone
because it was SCI that failed to remove the lots from the transaction.”).
164. Nichols v. Shelard Nat’l Bank, 294 N.W.2d 730, 734 (Minn. 1980).
165. SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., 795 N.W.2d at 866.
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parties as to the composition of assets and liabilities held by the
corporation whose stock is being sold. Instead, the seller will always
166
be held to have made a unilateral mistake, precluding relief.
D. The Effect of the SCI Decision: A Result-Oriented Decision?
Perhaps the supreme court’s decision in SCI was resultoriented. After all, the court seemed to vacillate about what the
167
When discussing rescission, the
“mistake” was in the case.
166. Id.
167. On the other hand, the supreme court’s decision in SCI could be viewed,
through the bent of certain legal scholarship, as policy-oriented. Consider
Duncan Kennedy’s discussion of the correlation between form and substance and
rules and standards in the law. In his article, Form and Substance in Private Law
Adjudication, Kennedy describes a school of legal thought justifying judicial
decisions based on form rather than substance. Duncan Kennedy, Forms and
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976). Kennedy states
that such decisions may result in “the imposition of liability on the actor who is not
morally blameworthy.” Id. at 1743. “The basic notion behind these arguments”
elevating formal rules over substance, writes Kennedy, is that “vigilance in one’s
interests [is one of a number of] economic goods” whose production should be
stimulated. Id.
The best way to stimulate their production is to sanction those who fail to
acquire them, by exposing them to breach of altruistic duty by those who
are more provident. The rule advocate may affirm that “this hurts me
more than it does you” as she administers the sanction. But the refusal to
tolerate present inequity would make everyone worse off in the long run.
Id. As applied to the result in SCI, the argument for the application of this
viewpoint would be that SCI should have undertaken whatever vigilance was
necessary to ensure that it knew of every asset owned by Crystal Lake before the
stock sale and that SCI will be bound to reap whatever may befall its failure to do
so. It seems likely that, if applied without restraint, this viewpoint would abrogate
most, if not all, equitable remedies. Roscoe Pound advocated for a somewhat
restrained application of this viewpoint, stating that “legal conceptions which are
applied mechanically are more adapted to property and to business transactions;
standards where application proceeds upon intuition are more adapted to human
conduct and to the conduct of enterprises.” Roscoe Pound, The Theory of Judicial
Decision, 36 HARV. L. REV. 940, 951 (1923). Unfortunately, aside from a vague
appeal to common sense, Pound fails to illustrate why his stated distinction is
normative. Kennedy, for his part, suggests that an attempt might be made to
balance form and substance in the law by researching “at the level of social reality.
. . . the actual influence of [decisions based on form and decisions based on
substance] on economic, social, and political life.” Duncan Kennedy, supra at
1738. Kennedy’s suggestion is, however, utterly indistinct from an articulation of
the basic reasons for and policies behind the historical development of equitable
remedies. As such, this legal scholarship collapses into traditional notions of
equity and the law, such as that so famously described by Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr.: “The distinctions of the law are founded on experience, not on logic.
It therefore does not make the dealings of men dependent on a mathematical
accuracy.” OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 244 (Mark DeWolfe Howe
ed., The Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press 1963) (1881).
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168

mistake related to the value of the Crystal Lake stock.
When
discussing reformation, however, the mistake morphed and
became SCI’s failure to remove the two properties from Crystal
169
The rationale behind this
Lake before the stock sale.
170
In all likelihood, the supreme
equivocation is never explained.
court was concerned that the mistake in SCI was one of value. For
reasons of efficiency and utility, equitable remedies cannot reach
mutual mistakes of value. Lord Henry Home Kames explained that
“[t]o indulge debate about the true value of every commercial
subject, would destroy commerce; and, for that reason, equity,
which has nothing in view but the interest of a single person, must
171
Yet, it seems
yield to utility, which regards the whole society.”
plausible that the mistake in SCI is more realistically characterized
not as one of value but as the failure of the written agreement to
reflect the parties’ undisputed bargain for the cemeteries and
funeral home businesses, not the vacant lots. Viewed this way, the
mistake would qualify for equitable relief through reformation, if
the supreme court had truly put aside Costello’s bright-line focus on
form in the reformation context.
Indeed, in SCI, the supreme court itself admits that
reformation should be easier to achieve than rescission because
“reformation . . . does not seek to unwind the transaction but
172
simply to modify it to reflect the parties’ actual intention.”
Consequently, the court should have followed its own advice and
fashioned a rule that allows Minnesota courts to look through the
corporate form when determining whether to reform stock sales
agreements because “[a] legal conclusion which is sound for one
purpose may be unrealistic . . . when applied to a different though
173
related purpose.” In this too, the supreme court strayed from its
168. SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., 795 N.W.2d at 862.
169. Id. at 866.
170. Pound, supra note 167, at 941 (“Having to decide so many cases and to
write so many opinions, either consideration of the merits of the actual
controversy must yield to the need of detailed formulation of a precedent that will
not embarrass future decision, or careful formulation must give way to the
demand for study of the merits of the case in hand. . . . [T]oo often both these
things happen and the case itself is not as well considered as the court could wish,
while much is said in deciding it which must be re-examined as well as may be
when cited to the court in other controversies.”). But see LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE IN
WONDERLAND 72 (North-South Books 1999) (1866) (“Take care of the sense, and
the sounds will take care of themselves.”).
171. KAMES, supra note 18, at 176.
172. SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., 795 N.W.2d at 865.
173. Minn. Odd Fellows Home v. Pogue, 245 Minn. 539, 544, 73 N.W.2d 615,
619 (1955).
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own declaration that “[i]n equity the court adapts its relief to
exigencies of the case in hand, and in so doing form always gives
174
way to substance.”
V. CONCLUSION
Since Costello, Minnesota has refused to look beyond the
form—the corporate form—of stock sale agreements to rescind
such agreements tainted with mutual mistake. SCI provided the
Minnesota Supreme Court with the opportunity to follow its own
mandate that “[e]quity’s vision is not circumscribed by formal
instruments, but extends through matters of form to the heart of
175
Yet, despite the supreme court’s express
the transaction.”
limitation of Costello’s focus on form solely to actions for rescission,
the supreme court failed in SCI to leave open any avenue of
meaningful equitable relief for mutual mistake through
reformation. Instead, the supreme court refused to look for
mutual mistake beyond the corporate form. The supreme court
supported this refusal with principles of corporate law—the same
principles of corporate law that support Costello. Moreover, the
supreme court charged the corporate form, as a matter of law, with
knowledge sufficient to guarantee a unilateral mistake that will
nearly always preclude the reformation of stock sale agreements.
The supreme court’s focus on the form of a stock sale
agreement where the parties are seeking equitable relief is at odds
with the court’s express rejection of Costello in the reformation
context, as well as with longstanding judicial principles of equity.
SCI effectively forecloses any meaningful equitable relief for stock
sale agreements tainted with mutual mistake, leaving purchasers
and sellers of stock helpless.

174.
175.

Garrey v. Nelson, 185 Minn. 487, 489, 242 N.W. 12, 13 (1932).
Holien v. Slee, 120 Minn. 261, 267, 139 N.W. 493, 495 (1913).
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